BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//hacksw/handcal//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTEND:20150504T223000Z
UID:6aef661359f27
DTSTAMP:20261107T095531Z
LOCATION:VPD LL101A
DESCRIPTION:<p>Standard Medicare Part D drug insurance provides limited coverage in a "donut hole" region\, making the purchase problem dynamic.<br />
We develop a discontinuity-based test for myopia using enrollees who arrived near the coverage gap early in the year. We find that there are fewer and cheaper purchases immediately after reaching the gap\, providing evidence in favor of myopia. We structurally estimate a dynamic drug purchase model and find complete myopia. For a nationally representative sample\, "behavioral hazard" increases enrollee spending by 41%. Entirely eliminating the gap would increase insurer spending 31%\, compared to 6% for generic-only gap coverage.</p>

URL;VALUE=URI:https://static.usc.edu/seminars/myopia_and_complex_dynamic_incentives_evidence_medicare_part_d-1426891904
SUMMARY:Myopia and Complex Dynamic Incentives: Evidence from Medicare Part D
DTSTART:20150504T210000Z
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR