BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//hacksw/handcal//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VEVENT DTEND:20160901T210000Z UID:6a9e20049db1e DTSTAMP:20260906T192300Z LOCATION:VPD 302 DESCRIPTION:

Laboratory experiments employing an induced-values methodology often report on allocative efficiencies observed. That methodology requires experimenters know subjects’ motivations precisely\, questionable in labs\, impossible in field experiments. Allocative efficiency implies a hypothetical costless aftermarket would be inactive. An allocation mechanism’s outcome is defined to be behaviorally efficient if an appropriate aftermarket is actually appended to the mechanism and measures at most a negligible size of remaining mutually beneficial gains. Methodological requirements for an appropriate aftermarket are specified. A first demonstration observes more frequent and ex-ante larger behavioral inefficiencies in second- than in first-price auctions. A simple field demonstration indicates when a public-good increase can be observed to cover marginal cost to subjects’ mutual benefit\, without knowing valuations. A wide variety of empirical economic-policy studies can utilize this methodology to observe comparative evidence of alternative policies’ allocative efficiency shortfalls.
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URL;VALUE=URI:https://static.usc.edu/events/efficiency_measurement_revealed_thresholds_without_knowing_valuations-1471992999 SUMMARY:Efficiency Measurement via Revealed Thresholds\, Without Knowing Valuations DTSTART:20160901T200000Z END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR